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Introduction
Can machines think? This question was posed by Alan Turing in his landmark
paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” published in 1950. Turing had in mind
a particular kind of machine, a Turing machine. Modern electronic digital computers are
equivalent to Turing machines, ignoring the constraint of finite memory. For the
purposes of this paper, we can define a computer as any machine equivalent to a Turing
machine. Turing’s landmark paper seeded an entire paradigm in the philosophy of
mind that holds that the mind is, essentially, a computer. More precisely, the mind can
be thought of as a software program running on the hardware of the brain, with mental
states being identical to computational states/processes. And, if this is right, then there
is in principle no barrier to creating artificial minds (1) by way of merely programming
a computer in the appropriate way or (2) by merely bringing about the right sort of
computational processes. At least, this is the hope and belief of many computer
scientists and philosophers of mind today. Turing himself answered his own question in
the affirmative and proposed a test—the Turing Test—for determining whether a
computer could genuinely think and possess mentality.
Although popular views today, I want to argue that (1) and (2) are just plain
wrong. More precisely, (1) can be stated as the thesis of Strong AI.1 Strong AI can be
defined as the following two-part thesis:
“(a) an appropriately programmed computer really would have (or be) a mind in
the same sense that you or I have,
and
(b) its following the program(s) in question would explain its ability to do the
psychological things it does” (Preston & Bishop, 2002, pg. 14).
And, more precisely, (2) can be stated as the thesis of computationalism.
Computationalism is the thesis that mental states are computational processes. As Larry
Hauser puts it: “Computationalism says that computation is what thought is essentially:
(the right) computation is metaphysically necessary for thought…and (right) computation
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metaphysically suffices [for thought]” (Hauser, 2002, pp. 124). A computational process can
be defined simply as a process that instantiates or carries out a computation. By
computation, I mean a calculation carried out solely in accordance with an effective method
2, i.e., any calculation that can be performed by a Turing machine (Copeland, 2017). In
refuting these two theses, I hope to show that pure computation cannot possibly suffice
for mind.3 The mind, whatever it is, cannot be purely computational in nature.
Therefore, a computer qua computer cannot have or be a mind.
This last point brings us to the discussion of another important definition, that of
mind. What is a mind? Well, we can consider a simple definition as follows: A mind is a
substance or an event or process that manifests things like consciousness, qualia,
thought, and intentionality. Giving a more satisfactory and rigorous definition of mind
is difficult without taking a stance with regard to a particular form of dualism or
materialism. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, I will simply stipulate that I take
consciousness, intentionality, and qualia to be essential attributes of the mind. If
something fails to have one or more of these attributes, then it is not a mind. I want to
argue that, by way of pure computation alone, these attributes (intentionality in
particular) cannot be generated.
My thesis (stated precisely) is as follows: (1) The thesis that the appropriately
programmed computer, by virtue of running the right program, would literally have or
be a mind in the same sense that you or I have (Strong AI) is false, and (2) The thesis
that mental states are identical to computational states/processes (computationalism) is
similarly false. Pure computation, therefore, can never be sufficient for mind.
Against Strong AI
In defense of part (1) of my thesis, I will provide a robust defense of the famous
Chinese Room Argument. As I will argue, the Chinese Room Argument makes a
powerful case against Strong AI. As part of my defense of the argument, I consider four
major objections: the Systems Reply, the Robot Reply, the Brain Simulator Reply, and the
reply from connectionism. As part of my consideration of the Systems Reply, I offer an
original argument as a response.
The Chinese Room Argument
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In 1980, in an article titled “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” the philosopher John
Searle first published his famous argument—dubbed the Chinese Room Argument
(CRA)—against both Strong AI and the adequacy of the Turing Test. The CRA consists
of a thought experiment along with a species of arguments based on the scenario. The
CRA can be summarized as follows:
Suppose we have a man named Clerk who is locked inside of a room, the
Chinese Room. Clerk is a monolingual English speaker. Inside the Room is Clerk,
a pencil, many sheets of paper, and a rulebook. The Room is closed off to the
outside except for a small slit at the bottom of the door leading into the Room.
On the outside of the door is a native Chinese speaker. The native Chinese
speaker slips numerous sheets of paper with Chinese symbols on them through
the slit at the bottom of the door. What’s written on some of these sheets is a
story written in Chinese. What’s written on the remaining sheets are questions
about the story (also written in Chinese). Clerk, on the inside, receives these
sheets and consults his rulebook to see what to do with the information on them.
The rulebook is written in English and contains instructions for how to correlate
one set of Chinese symbols with another set of Chinese symbols. Clerk then
follows the rules of the rulebook and (using his pencil) writes down Chinese
symbols on the blank sheets of paper he has with him in the Room. Once
finished, Clerk slips these sheets of paper (containing Chinese symbols) through
the slit at the bottom of the door. Then, on the outside, the native Chinese
speaker picks up the sheets of paper and reads them. And he is fully convinced
that the man in the Room (Clerk) understands Chinese. In particular, he thinks
that Clerk understood the Chinese story and provided perfectly reasonable
answers to the questions posed about the story. However, Clerk in fact doesn’t
understand Chinese at all. To him, the Chinese characters he received as input
and produced as output were just meaningless symbols (Preston & Bishop, 2002,
pg. 18).
In Searle’s own words (as presented by B. Jack Copeland):
“[Clerk] do[es] not understand a word of the Chinese stories. [Clerk] ha[s] inputs
and outputs that are indistinguishable from the native Chinese speaker, and
[Clerk] can have any formal program you like, but [Clerk] still understand[s]
nothing. [A] computer4 for the same reasons understands nothing of any
stories…[W]hatever purely formal principles you put into the computer will not
be sufficient for understanding, since a human will be able to follow the formal
principles without understanding…” (Copeland, 2002, pp. 110). Note that
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“Clerk” has been inserted into Searle’s words. Originally, Searle placed himself in
the scenario.
Unfortunately, Searle does not give a precise definition of understanding. Thus,
in the interest of rendering the CRA a bit more rigorous, I propose the following
definition: Understanding is the cognitive faculty by which, or the mental state in which,
one comes to know or knows the meaning or meanings of things. From this definition,
we can say that x understands y just in case x knows the meaning or meanings of y.
Symbolically,
(∀x)(∀y)(Uxy ≡ (∀z)(Mzy ⊃ Kxz)), where U = understands,M = is a meaning
of, and K = knows. Regarding knowledge, I will simply adopt the justified true belief
definition.
To summarize, the CRA illustrates the following: A computer merely implements
purely syntactical rules. And syntax, as Searle is fond of saying, is not sufficient for
semantics. This is a core principle in Searle’s philosophy. Given this, the computer
therefore has no way of attaching meanings to the symbols it processes. Thus, as
illustrated in the Chinese Room, the computer cannot attach meanings to the symbols
making up the Chinese story it receives as input. Thus, under the proposed definition of
understanding, the computer does not understand the Chinese story, even though it
passes the Turing Test for doing so. And since understanding (and intentional states in
general) is a fundamental faculty of the mind (minds like ours at least), it follows that
an appropriately programmed computer, by virtue of running a program, cannot have
or be a mind. But then tenet (a) of the Strong AI thesis is false, entailing the falsehood of
Strong AI. This establishes part (1) of my thesis. Furthermore, the Turing Test, as a
decisive test of genuine intelligence, is inadequate. This is the basic thrust of the CRA
and its various incarnations.
A brutally simple argument following from the above reasoning and the Chinese Room
scenario—oddly enough dubbed the “Brutally Simple Argument”—can be formulated
as follows:
1. Programs are purely formal (syntactical).
2. Minds (human ones, at least) have semantics, mental (i.e. semantic)
contents.
3. Syntax by itself is neither the same as, nor sufficient for, semantic content.
4. Therefore, programs by themselves are not constitutive of nor sufficient
for minds (Preston & Bishop, 2002, pg. 28).
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Searle takes the Chinese Room scenario to illustrate the truth of the third premise. What
Clerk is doing in the Chinese Room is, as Searle would say, “purely syntactical.” He is
merely following a set of formal rules. And though Clerk passes the Turing Test for
understanding Chinese, Clerk does not in fact understand Chinese, at least not by virtue
of running the purely syntactical program. Therefore, the thought experiment illustrates
the aforementioned core principle that syntax is not sufficient for semantics.
A quick objection should be addressed first before getting to the more interesting
objections. An objector might very well say something along the following lines: “Wait a
minute, Searle. The Chinese Room does not illustrate that syntax is by itself insufficient
for semantics. All it shows is that the particular syntax of the particular program Clerk is
running is insufficient for semantics. The reason Clerk doesn’t understand Chinese is
that he must just be running the wrong program.”
What should we make of this objection? By my estimation, not much. Clearly, we
could give any Chinese understanding program we like to Clerk (assuming it’s
Turing-computable) to execute and the results of the thought experiment would be the
same. Recall in the above exposition of the scenario, Searle states: “[Clerk] can have any
formal program you like…” (emphasis added). The objection that Clerk must be
running the wrong program, therefore, holds no water.
Systems Reply
Perhaps the chief objection to the CRA is that all it is capable of showing is that
Clerk— who is but a part of the Chinese Room—cannot understand Chinese by virtue
of running the program. But maybe it is the Room as a whole that understands Chinese.
Clerk is really analogous to the CPU, and the Room as a whole is analogous to the
computer. And from the fact that the CPU doesn’t understand Chinese, it doesn’t follow
that the computer as a system does not understand Chinese. Remember, the contention
of Strong AI is that an appropriately programmed computer would have or be a mind. It
does not contend that an appropriately programmed CPU would have or be a mind.
Thus, the CRA fails to refute Strong AI. This objection is defended, for instance, by Ned
Block (2002) in his article “Searle’s Arguments against Cognitive Science.”
Searle’s response to this point is to tweak the scenario in the following way:
Imagine that Clerk internalizes everything in the Room. He memorizes the rulebook
and runs through the logic of the program in his head, keeping track of everything
mentally without using a pencil and paper. Clerk, in this scenario, has now become the
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Room. There is now nothing in the Room in the original scenario that is not inside him.
The rest of the scenario then proceeds as usual. Clerk runs through the program, passes
the Turing Test for understanding Chinese, and yet does not understand Chinese. And
since Clerk now comprises the entire room, since he does not understand Chinese, the
Room also does not understand Chinese. The Systems Reply, so says Searle, therefore
fails.
With Searle’s response to the Systems Reply, however, comes another objection,
what might be called the Subsystems Reply. While it may now be true that the Room
does not understand Chinese, it doesn’t follow that therefore no part of the Room
understands Chinese. In computer terminology, just because the computer as a whole
does not understand Chinese, it doesn’t follow therefore that no subsystem in the
computer understands Chinese. The claim is that Searle moves from committing the
fallacy of composition to committing the fallacy of division.
B. Jack Copeland is a proponent of this line of attack against the CRA. Regarding
the standard (what Copeland calls the vanilla) CRA, Copeland argues that the argument
is not logically valid. As Copeland states: “The proposition that the formal symbol
manipulation carried out by Clerk does not enable Clerk to understand the Chinese
story by no means entails the quite different proposition that the formal symbol
manipulation carried out by Clerk does not enable the Room to understand the Chinese
story” (Copeland, 2002, pp. 110).
This is a form of the Systems Reply, though Copeland wants to distance the
objection from that label. Instead, Copeland calls his objection the “logical reply.” Still, it
can be considered to be of the same species as the Systems Reply, as the claim is still that
the CRA fails to show that the Room as a whole lacks understanding and other
intentional states.
Copeland formulates a revised CRA based on Searle’s Systems Reply rebuttal as
follows:
1. The system is part of Clerk.
2. If Clerk (in general, x) does not understand the Chinese story (in general,
does not ϕ), then no part of Clerk (x) understands the Chinese story (ϕs).
3. The formal symbol manipulation carried out by Clerk does not enable
Clerk to understand the Chinese story.
4. Therefore, the formal symbol manipulation carried out by Clerk does not
enable the system to understand the Chinese story (Copeland, 2002, pp. 111).
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In responding to this new argument, Copeland takes Searle to task by pressing his
version of the Subsystems Reply, setting his sights especially on the second premise.
Copeland writes: “It is all too conceivable that a homunculus or homuncular system in
Clerk’s head should be able to understand Chinese without Clerk being able to do so”
(Copeland, 2002, pp. 112). Edward Feser adds: “But maybe…[Clerk’s] conscious
understanding of English might be identical to his running a certain program (the
program for English competence), while at the same time, by virtue of his following the
rules of the rulebook and implementing the program for Chinese understanding, there
is a second stream of consciousness that is consciously aware of speaking and
understanding Chinese, even if the English-speaking program isn’t” (Feser, 2005, pg.
124). Ned Block argues similarly (Block, 2002, pp. 74). This second stream of
consciousness, per Copeland, can be conceptualized as a homunculus or homuncular
system in Clerk’s head running a subprogram as part of the overall program Clerk is
running. What Searle must do, therefore, is show that this possibility isn’t actual.
Otherwise, we have no grounds for thinking that premise 2 is true.
Matryoshka Homunculi Argument
In response to Copeland’s Subsystems Reply, I propose the following response,
what I call the Matryoshka Homunculi Argument (inspired by Daniel Dennett’s idea of
homuncular decomposition5). We can apply homuncular decomposition to Clerk as
follows: Let hi denote a homunculus. Then, there is a set {h1, …, hn} of homunculi inside
Clerk, for some positive integer n. Then, for each homunculus in this set, there is a set of
homunculi contained within it. Then, for each homunculus in this set, there is a set of
homunculi contained within it, and so on until we reach a basic level of homunculi that
cannot be broken down any further. Figure 1 below provides a visual diagram of
homuncular decomposition for three levels of decomposition. The strategy, of course,
extends to any arbitrary number of levels.
Figure 1: Tree diagram of homuncular decomposition for three levels
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Now, we can apply the CRA to this scenario as follows: In response to the
Systems Reply, we can, per Searle, suppose that Clerk internalizes the Room, such that
he now comprises the Room. And since he does not understand Chinese by virtue of
running a computer program, neither does the Room. But, per Copeland, perhaps a
homunculus or homuncular system (a subsystem) inside Clerk does understand
Chinese by virtue of running a computer program (a subprogram of the overall
program Clerk is running). But we can now apply the CRA to this homunculus or
homuncular system. Using our diagram as a visual, we can consider the first level of
homunculi inside Clerk, Level 1. Level 1 contains a set of homunculi {h1, …, hn}. Now,
we know that the set as a whole does not understand Chinese because Clerk comprises
this whole system, and we have shown that he does not understand Chinese. We can
then show that none of the individual homunculi understand Chinese by applying the
CRA to each homunculus in the set. The result is that an individual homunculus, h i,
does not understand Chinese for the same reason Clerk does not in the original Chinese
Room.
But, Copeland might say, perhaps there is a subsystem, i.e., another homunculus
or homuncular system in one or more of these Level 1 homunculi that understands
Chinese by virtue of running a computer program. Now we are at Level 2. And for any
homunculus in Level 2, we can apply the CRA to it and show that it cannot understand
Chinese by virtue of running a computer program. For instance, we can take all the
Level 2 homunculi contained within h1 from Level 1 and show that none of them
understands Chinese. But here one might object with the Systems Reply all over again.
Perhaps the system of homunculi contained within, for instance, h1 from Level 1
understands Chinese, even though none of the individual homunculi in the system do.
But we have in fact already shown that this is not the case. h1 from Level 1 comprises
this whole system. And we have already shown that it does not understand Chinese.
Thus, neither the system (h1) nor the individual homunculi in the system understand
Chinese by virtue of running a computer program.
This same reasoning can be carried out for the rest of the homunculi in Level 2.
We can then continue on with this strategy for Level 3, and so on for however many
levels Clerk happens to have. And once we reach the last, most basic level of homunculi
and show (via this same strategy) that no understanding of Chinese by virtue of
running a computer program can be generated in this level, we will have reached a
terminus at which Copeland would be unable to appeal to some further homunculus or
homuncular system that could possibly understand Chinese.
We can summarize this strategy by conceptualizing the homunculi (or “little
Clerks” if we’re feeling affectionate) inside Clerk as a collection of multiple sets of
Russian matryoshka dolls (depicted in Figure 2 below). The dolls in Level 1 (the largest
dolls) contain the dolls in Level 2, which in turn contain the dolls in Level 3, and so on.
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The dolls in the most basic level are the smallest and do not themselves contain any
dolls. The CRA is then applied to each of these dolls.
Figure 2: A set of Russian matryoshka dolls
What this argument shows is that Clerk does not understand Chinese (and so, a
fortiori, neither does the Room), and no subsystem within Clerk understands Chinese,
by virtue of running a computer program. Thus, Copeland’s objection fails, and the
CRA stands.
One objection to this argument would be to say that maybe there is an infinite
chain of homunculi. Thus, we never actually reach a terminus and Copeland can
continue appealing to further homunculi ad infinitum. This, however, is a nonstarter. For
if we suppose that Clerk’s intentionality is to be explained in terms of h1’s intentionality,
and h1’s intentionality is to be explained in terms of h2’s intentionality, and so on ad
infinitum, then we never really get to any bedrock explanation, leaving Clerk’s
intentionality ultimately unexplained and ontologically ungrounded.
Robot Reply
Another reply to the CRA is that the reason Clerk lacks understanding is because
he lacks contact with the outside world. What’s needed is a way to sense things and
react to stimuli, creating the right sort of causal relations between the symbols in the
program and the things they refer to. The contention is, therefore, that an appropriately
programmed robot (with sensors) would have a mind by virtue of running a computer
program (Preston & Bishop, 2002, pg. 31). This is the Robot Reply. Searle’s response to
the Robot Reply is to modify the scenario by putting sensors on the outside of the room.
These sensors can then scan the outside world and have causal interaction with it. But
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Clerk only has access to the output of the sensors, which consists merely of more
symbols for him to manipulate. Thus, Clerk still, by virtue of running the program, has
no way of attaching meaning to these symbols. Therefore, Clerk still does not have
understanding and other intentional states by running the program. The Robot Reply,
so says Searle, thus fails.
However, the Systems Reply can then be pressed against Searle (thus combining
the Systems Reply and the Robot Reply). Clerk in this revised scenario is really just a
homunculus in the robot’s head, implementing but a part of the robot. He isn’t
implementing the whole system. In particular, he isn’t implementing the operation of
the sensors. Perhaps the whole robot has understanding and other intentional states,
despite the fact that Clerk, who is but a part of the robot, does not (Bringsjord & Noel,
2002, pp. 150-151). But Searle can respond to this objection by deploying a strategy quite
similar to the one he deploys against the typical Systems Reply.6
As a final note, it should be said that the Robot Reply in fact tacitly concedes the
point that computation alone is not enough for mental states (intentionality in
particular); rather, what’s needed is computation plus causal interaction with the
environment. Thus, even if the Robot Reply should be found persuasive, it really
doesn’t cut against my thesis anyway.
Brain Simulator Reply
Yet another reply to the CRA (by now, I suspect you are getting the impression
that this is a widely discussed argument) is the Brain Simulator Reply, which can be
stated as follows:
“Suppose…[the program] simulates the actual sequence of neuron firings at the
synapses [in] the brain of a native Chinese speaker when he understands stories
in Chinese and gives answers to them…[S]urely in such a case we would have to
say that the machine understood the stories; and if we refuse to say that,
wouldn’t we also have to deny that native Chinese speakers understood the
stories?” (Winograd, 2002, pp. 87).
Searle responds to this by appealing to the principle that simulation is not duplication
(Searle, 2002, pp. 52). We can define simulation as follows: x simulates y just in case x
replicates enough properties of y such that x can be considered to be equivalent to y in a
certain context. We can define duplication as: x duplicates y just in case x replicates every
property of y.7 Under these definitions, simulation and duplication are not necessarily
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mutually exclusive categories; nevertheless (importantly), duplication is not entailed by
simulation.
The justification for the principle is, in my view, quite strong. In defending the
principle, Searle asks us to imagine a computer simulation of digestion, pointing out
that it would be absurd to suggest that such a simulation could actually digest things
like beer or pizza. Searle writes, “You can simulate the cognitive processes of the human
mind as you can simulate rain storms, five alarm fires, digestion, or anything else that
you can describe precisely. But it is just as ridiculous to think that a system that had a
simulation of consciousness and other mental processes thereby had the mental
processes, as it would be to think that the simulation of digestion on a computer could
thereby actually digest beer and pizza” (Searle, 2002, pp. 52). Given such powerful
counterexamples to its falsehood, Searle’s principle is highly plausible, providing a
powerful reason to reject the Brain Simulator Reply. The fact that we can simulate neural
processes with computation does not entail that we can duplicate neural processes with
computation.
Connectionist Objections and the Chinese Gym
A final (and formidable) objection I will consider comes from proponents of
connectionism, the idea that the mind is a large neural network with many nodes
simultaneously interacting with each other as a parallel system. The objection is that the
CRA targets a serial computer. Parallel computation performed by a collection of
computers (forming computational neural networks), therefore, avoids the CRA. Searle
has two responses to this. The first is to argue that parallel computations can be
simulated serially. More technically, any finite collection of Turing machines can be
simulated by a single universal Turing machine. And, therefore, the original CRA can be
pressed against connectionism with the proviso that Clerk can simulate parallel
computation by running a parallel program serially in the appropriate way.
Our friend Copeland, however, argues that this response to connectionism fails. To do
so, Copeland uses Searle’s core principle at work against the Brain Simulator Reply (as
stated above): simulation is not duplication. To think that simulation is duplication would
be to commit what Copeland calls the simulation fallacy. He states it formally as follows:
“x is a simulation of y; y has property ϕ, therefore x has property ϕ” (Copeland, 2002,
pp. 115). Thus, from the fact that Clerk is simulating parallel computations, it does not
follow that he is therefore duplicating parallel computations. The CRA is therefore
powerless against connectionism. And (I would add) if Searle, upon hearing this
EPISTEME XXXI 16
objection, decides to abandon his own principle, then the Brain Simulator Reply can be
pressed against him. We can formulate this reasoning in the form of a constructive
dilemma as follows:
1. Either the principle that simulation is not duplication is true or it is false.
2. If the principle that simulation is not duplication is true, then the CRA
fails (defeated by connectionism).
3. If the principle that simulation is not duplication is false, then the CRA
fails (defeated by the Brain Simulator Reply).
4. Therefore, the CRA fails.
In my view, this objection is very plausible (under the assumption that the brain is
sufficient for mind). At the very least, the objection shows that the CRA is inconclusive
with regard to connectionism.
So, is connectionism victorious? Not quite. Recall that I mentioned Searle has two
responses. The second response is to construct a new scenario, the Chinese Gym. Searle
describes the Chinese Gym scenario as follows:
“Imagine that instead of a Chinese room, I have a Chinese gym: a hall containing
many monolingual English-speaking men. These men would carry out the same
operations as the nodes and synapses in a connectionist architecture…and the
outcome would be the same as having one man manipulate symbols according
to a rule book. No one in the gym speaks a word of Chinese…Yet with
appropriate adjustments, the system could give the correct answers to Chinese
questions” (Copeland, 2002, pp. 116).
Copeland’s reply to this is that another kind of Systems Reply can be mounted against
the Chinese Gym. Just because none of the individuals in the Gym understand Chinese,
it doesn’t follow that therefore the Gym as a whole does not understand Chinese.
Copeland writes, “The fallacy involved in moving from part to whole is even more
glaring than in the original version of the Chinese Room Argument” (Copeland, 2002,
pp. 116). In response to this objection, Searle could deploy a strategy similar to the one
deployed in his response to the Systems Reply to the original Chinese Room. We can
suppose that Clerk internalizes the Gym such that he now comprises the entire
connectionist network. Now, questions from a Chinese speaker are posed to Clerk who
then…what? If we say that Clerk simply “submits” the input to the Gym inside him and
then receives the output, it is certainly true that Clerk does not understand Chinese. But
to say that this shows that the Gym doesn’t understand Chinese would be to beg the
question. In fact, this reply is really just a facade. All we’ve done, essentially, is to take
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the connectionist network, throw it inside a box, argue that the box doesn’t understand
Chinese, and then conclude that the connectionist network therefore doesn’t understand
Chinese.
If instead we say that Clerk is actively running through the parallel program that
would have otherwise been instantiated in the connectionist network, then what Clerk
is really doing (given that he is acting as a serial computer) is merely simulating the
connectionist network, thus opening the way for our constructive dilemma. Thus, this
line of argument won’t work. Although I’m unwilling to say that the connectionist is
ultimately victorious, I must tentatively conclude that the CRA is inconclusive against
connectionism. However, there are other (arguably) more fundamental arguments that
will be explored in the section on computationalism that strike forcefully against
connectionism. And it is to that section that I shall now turn.
Against Computationalism
In defense of part (2) of my thesis, I will turn my attention to a refutation of
computationalism. In many ways, the arguments presented here cut a wider swath than
the CRA is capable of on its own. We’ve seen, for instance, that the CRA is (arguably)
inconclusive against connectionism. First, it is worth pointing out how Strong AI and
computationalism differ. It is, for instance, possible to adhere to one and not the other.
For example, saying that an appropriately programmed computer would have or be a
mind does not commit one to also saying that mental states are identical to
computational processes. Strong AI does entail that computation is sufficient for mental
states, but it is not committed to saying that mental states are identical to computational
states. Computationalism also sets out to be a more full-bodied position than Strong AI
(as defined in this paper). For instance, computationalism insists that the right causal
relationships between computational states and the right (computational) processes
must be generated in order to guarantee mental content. As we’ll see, this is a key point
made by computationalists. Programs alone are not enough. Processes are what is
essential. In this way, computationalism tries to take causal powers more seriously than
Strong AI, tries being the operative word.
Processes over Programs
In response to the Chinese Room, computationalists object and argue that the
problem with the dialectic is that it conceptualizes the mind as a black box with only
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inputs and outputs being relevant. But the mind, according to computationalists, is not
a black box. Rather, what’s essential to the mind is what goes on in between inputs and
outputs—the internal processes. For instance, Georges Rey argues that the Chinese
Room attacks a behavioristic strawman. In contrast to the defunct position of
behaviorism, Rey argues that computationalism (he refers to this as a version of Strong
AI in his article) is a species of functionalism, the dominant position in the philosophy
of mind today, and that Searle misunderstands the functionalist project.
Computationalism, so says Rey, takes processes and not merely behavior seriously,
unlike the CRA. He further adds that the computationalist needn’t be at all committed
to the Turing Test (Rey, 2002, pp. 201-206). The charge is that the CRA therefore fails to
refute computationalism.
A similar computationalist objection to the CRA (specifically, the Brutally Simple
Argument) comes from the aforementioned Larry Hauser. Hauser challenges the first
premise on the grounds that “although programs are purely syntactic, the processes in
which they run are not” (Preston & Bishop, 2002, pg. 36). Running programs have
causal and dynamic properties that “static” programs do not. Hauser concludes that the
Brutally Simple Argument therefore misses the point, at least as far as
computationalism is concerned. So what if static programs are purely syntactical?
Dynamic programs are not (Hauser, 2002, pp. 126). The premise is, therefore, ambiguous.
Does it refer to static programs or dynamic programs? If it refers to static programs,
then (Hauser would concede) the premise is true, but it is irrelevant to the claims of
computationalism. If instead it refers to dynamic (running) programs, then (says
Hauser) the premise is false. Either way, the argument fails to refute computationalism.
I have two responses to this objection. The first response is to defend the Brutally
Simple Argument against Hauser. While it may be true that the processes in which
programs run are not purely syntactical, nevertheless the aspect of those processes by
virtue of which they are instantiating a program (by virtue of which they are
computational processes) is purely syntactical.8 The processes instantiating the program
do so by following the rules of the program. And those rules are purely syntactical. If
Hauser wants to say that it is really the physical processes and not the formal
rule-following qua rule-following that is constitutive of mind, then the program itself
would seem to be superfluous, for it is all too conceivable that the same physical
processes could be present without any program present that the processes would
otherwise be instantiating.9
And if it is the physical processes that are supposed to be sufficient for semantics
and for mind, then the program and computations themselves would seem to be
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causally inefficacious, so why bother positing them as being significant to the mind in
the first place? By my lights, the theory is explanatorily bankrupt and in need of a shave
from Occam’s razor. But then, part (b) of the Strong AI thesis is false, in addition to part
(a). The appropriately programmed computer (qua programmed computer) cannot
really have or be a mind, and its following the program in question would not explain
its ability to do the psychological things it does. We thus have additional support for
part (1) of my thesis. Furthermore, since the argument shows also that computation qua
computation is not sufficient for mind, computationalism is similarly shown to be false,
thus proving part (2) of my thesis.
Another response is to accept the basic thrust of Hauser’s objection and abandon
the Brutally Simple Argument in favor of another argument based on the Chinese Room
scenario. The Chinese Room scenario is in fact a description of a running program, not
merely a static program. Clerk is instantiating the program, giving it the causal and
dynamic properties that Hauser has in mind in his objection. And still, Clerk does not
understand Chinese by virtue of these causal and dynamic properties exhibited by the
processes in which the program is executed. But then, the Chinese Room scenario
shows that running programs are not sufficient for semantic content any more than
static programs are. The argument can be formalized as follows:
1. Minds have understanding and other intentional states.
2. Instantiating a computer program (computational processing) is never by
itself a sufficient condition for understanding and other intentional states.
3. Therefore, instantiating a computer program (computational processing)
is never by itself a sufficient condition for minds.
The Chinese Room scenario, in this case, can be used to support premise 2. Hauser
notes that the argument no longer makes reference to the syntax-semantics distinction,
but so what? The soundness of the argument doesn’t have anything to do with whether
it makes reference to the syntax-semantics distinction.
Hauser, however, has another arrow in his quiver. Premise 2 of this new argument is far
less obvious than premise 3 of the Brutally Simple Argument. Nevertheless, our claim is
that the Chinese Room thought experiment provides support for premise 2 of this new
argument just as it provides support for premise 3 of the Brutally Simple Argument.
However, premise 3 of the Brutally Simple Argument (Syntax by itself is neither the
same as, nor sufficient for, semantic content) is a conceptual, logical truth, the kind of
truth that can be established by a thought experiment like the Chinese Room. Premise 2
of the new argument, however, is not a mere logical truth (not obviously so, anyway).
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Thus, the Chinese Room experiment, says Hauser, “must bear some empirical weight;
and here, it’s the experiment that doesn’t suffice” (Hauser, 2002, pp. 127). Hauser argues
that the Chinese Room is but a single experiment and its results are contrary to those of
other “real” experiments. Hauser argues that it is evidently the case, for instance, that
computers are capable of doing such things as seeking, comparing, and deciding. And
these activities are indicative of mentality and thought. Moreover, computers are
evidently capable of following rules and carrying out instructions, a further indication
that computers are capable of mental activities. Computational processing, Hauser
concludes, therefore does seem to suffice for mind (Hauser, 2002, pp. 129, 141).
How a Computer “Computes”
In response to Hauser, I want to argue that the idea that computers literally
follow rules and carry out instructions is mistaken. At the very least, the suggestion
carries little force once we take into account how an electronic digital computer really
works at the hardware level. The primary component of a computer, of course, is the
central processing unit (CPU). Within the CPU are two major components: the control
unit and the arithmetic logic unit (ALU). To simplify the discussion, I’ll focus on the
ALU. The ALU is responsible for performing arithmetic and logic operations such as
addition, logical AND, and so forth. Let’s consider a very simple 1-bit ALU as depicted
below:
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Figure 3: A 1-bit ALU, taken from (Tanenbaum & Austin, 2013, pg. 167)
This particular ALU performs four different operations: addition, logical AND,
logical OR, and logical NOT. For any particular processing cycle, one operation is
“selected” and “carried out” or “executed” on the “inputs” and the resulting “output”
is transmitted outside of the ALU. I put these terms in scare quotes because I want to
argue that the ALU does not literally or intrinsically do these things. Physically, the
inputs, instructions, and outputs are nothing more than electrical signals being sent
through the circuitry of the ALU. The inputs in the diagram are A and B. The
instructions are encoded by F0 and F1. To simplify, we’ll ignore INVA, ENA, and ENB, as
their consideration is irrelevant to the argument. Now, the electrical signals running
through the circuitry are either high voltage or low voltage (the specific numerical
measure isn’t important). Bits in a computer are represented by these signals and their
voltages. For instance, it is common for a high voltage to correspond to a 1 and a low
voltage to correspond to a 0. Thus, every bit has two possible states (hence, the name
binary or digital computer).
The operation the ALU is to perform in any given cycle depends on the states of
F0 and F1. Given that we have two variables, with each having two possible states, there
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are a total of 22 = 4 possible combinations of states (00, 01, 10, and 11). These four
combinations correspond to the four operations the ALU can perform. For example, (F0,
F1) = (0, 0) corresponds to logical AND, (F0, F1) = (0, 1) corresponds to logical OR, and so
forth.
With the conceptual machinery in place, let’s run through an operation
performed by this ALU. Suppose we have a high voltage transmitted down the A line
and a low voltage transmitted down the B line. Furthermore, let’s suppose we have a
high voltage running down the F0 line and a high voltage running down the F1 line.
Then, the circuitry (whose details we have ignored for simplification purposes) causes
the electrical signals being transmitted to behave in such a way that the voltage on the
Output line is high. Now, recall that we’ve decided to treat a high voltage as being
representative of a 1 and a low voltage as a 0. Our F0 and F1, therefore, both correspond
to 1, resulting in the “selection” of the addition operation. A then corresponds to 1, and
B corresponds to 0. The Output, then, being a high voltage, corresponds to 1, which
corresponds to the sum of 1 + 0.
Thus, our ALU has behaved as-if it had performed addition. But, literally and
intrinsically, all that physically happened was the transmission of electrical signals
through circuitry. That these electrical processes running through silicon performed
addition is true only so far as we have taken them to have done so. That is to say, it is we
who interpret these signals as having mathematical significance. The argument, then, is
that a computer has at best as-if intentionality (and other mental states) and not intrinsic
intentionality (and other mental states). It does not, contrary to Hauser, literally seek,
compare, and decide things nor does it literally follow rules and carry out instructions.
Rather, it merely behaves in accordance with rules that we describe. It is rather
analogous to the way in which a falling rock “follows” the law of gravity. Hauser’s
empirical weight, therefore, is as light as a feather.
An objection that might now be raised is as follows: All right, so the computer
does not literally follow rules. But the processes are, as you admit, behaving in
accordance with the rules of the program. And if something is behaving in accordance
with the rules of a program, then it is in fact instantiating that program. That’s just what
it is to instantiate a program.
My reply is that this suggestion is actually very damaging to the
computationalist cause. If anything that behaves in accordance with the rules of a
program is instantiating that program, then the whole notion of instantiating a program
becomes utterly trivial and explanatorily inept with regard to the mind. For this would
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entail that nearly (and possibly) everything is instantiating an infinity of programs.
Indeed, it can be argued that nearly everything instantiates every program and thus, a
fortiori, instantiates mind programs, leaving us with an absurd panpsychism (assuming
we are computationalists). This trivialization point carries with it, I think, a tremendous
amount of force against both Strong AI and computationalism and goes even deeper
than the Chinese Room Argument, and it is what I shall now turn to.
Trivialization Argument
In addition to his Chinese Room Argument, Searle has also given an argument
that what counts as a computer is up to us, and that something only counts as a
computer in the first place if we say so. Computation is, therefore, a mind-dependent,
observer-relative phenomenon (Searle, 2002, pp. 67). This point is exemplified by my
above argument involving the ALU. The ALU “performs” addition only relative to our
saying so, relative to us interpreting its physical states as having mathematical
significance. Searle then uses this idea to draw the conclusion that the concept of a
computer is entirely trivial. Almost anything could count as a computer running a
program. This follows because we can interpret physical states as computational states.
This is in fact what we do with electronic digital computers, as explained above with
the ALU. We interpret electrical voltages as having mathematical significance, as being
constitutive of bits. But there isn’t anything special about electricity here. Computation
can be realized in other things as well. It is, as functionalists like to say, multiply
realizable. What I want to argue is that computation is not merely multiply realizable,
but universally realizable.
If this trivialization point is correct, then computationalism would seem to
crumble. As John Preston writes, “If almost any process can count as almost any
computation, then the computationalist view of cognition, instead of being the
interesting (and empirical) hypothesis its advocates intend, is vacuous” (Preston &
Bishop, 2002, pg. 43). Hilary Putnam and Mark Bishop provide, I think, a compelling
case for this very proposition.
In the appendix of his book Representation and Reality, Putnam lays out an
argument that every open physical system is every finite state automaton (FSA). In
Putnam’s own words, “Every ordinary open system is a realization of every abstract
finite automaton” (Putnam, 1988, pg. 121). Bishop, in his article “Dancing with Pixies:
Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism,” provides a robust defense of a more
modest version of this argument. Bishop argues that “over a finite time window, every
open system implements the trace of a particular FSA Q, as it executes program (p) on
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input (x)” (Bishop, 2002, pp. 361). And if the computational states Q goes through are
sufficient for mental states and phenomenal experience, this entails, since every open
physical system implements a trace of Q, every open physical system has mental states
and phenomenal experience. Thus, computationalism, if it is true, entails panpsychism,
an absurd result. We thus have an informal reductio ad absurdum argument against
computationalism.
The argument goes like this: The operations of a Turing machine, taken over a
finite time interval, can be replicated by an FSA. This is true because, over a finite time
interval, a Turing machine transits a finite number of computational states. Thus, any
given trace of a program executed by a Turing machine over a finite time interval can be
implemented with an FSA even though, in general, Turing machines are
computationally more powerful than FSAs. Thus, an FSA can be said to be equivalent to
a Turing machine over a finite period of time in the sense that an FSA can replicate the
same computational states as a Turing machine over the finite time interval in question.
Therefore, if we have a Turing machine executing a program and instantiating
computations that are hypothesized to be sufficient for mind over a finite time interval,
an FSA, by instantiating those same computations over the interval in question, would
also be sufficient for mind.
With all this in mind, Bishop asks us to consider an FSA Q with states [A] and [B]
that, over a finite time interval [t1…t6], goes through the sequence of states <A B A B A
B>. Next, we can consider any open physical system S. Over a finite time interval, say
[t1…t6], S will go through physical states [s1…s6]. We can then map Q’s computational
states onto S’s physical states such that [A] corresponds to the disjunction of [s1 v s3 v s5]
and [B] corresponds to the disjunction of [s2 v s4 v s6]. With this mapping in place, as S
transits through its physical states over the time interval in question, it will completely
implement Q and its state transitions.10 And since it is clear that this same procedure
could be carried out for any FSA and open physical system having any (finite) number
of states and going through any particular state transitions over a finite time interval,
we may conclude that every open physical system implements the trace of any finite
state automaton executing a program with a defined input over a finite time interval.
And since an FSA is capable of instantiating a trace of any Turing-computable
program over a finite time interval, we can conclude that every open physical system
implements a trace of any Turing-computable program over a finite time interval. Now,
if we assume that Strong AI and computationalism are true, then, by running the right
program and instantiating the right computation, a mind emerges. And since every
open physical system implements a trace of any Turing-computable program over a
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finite time interval, a fortiori, every open physical system implements a trace of any
Turing-computable Strong AI program. Hence, we are left with the absurd conclusion
that every open physical system is suffused with mind. Given this absurdity, it must be
that our original assumption is false. That is, it must be that Strong AI and
computationalism are false. Reductio argument concluded.
Perhaps the chief objection to this argument is that S does not properly
implement Q because it lacks the ability to support what we might call counterfactuals of
computation. These are counterfactuals about what computation a computer would
perform were it in a particular machine state and given a particular input. Ned Block is
a proponent of this objection. Although Block refers specifically to a wall, his objection
can be generalized to any open physical system. It should also be noted that, in his
example, Block is referring to a simple 1-bit addition program. Block writes, “In order
for a wall to be [a] computer [performing addition], it isn’t enough for it to have states
that correspond to ‘0’ and ‘1’ followed by a state that corresponds to ‘1’. It must also be
such that had the ‘1’ input been replaced by a ‘0’ input, the ‘1’ output would have been
replaced by the ‘0’ output. In other words, it has to have symbolic states that satisfy not
only the actual computation, but also the possible computations that the computer could
have performed. And this is non-trivial” (Block, 2002, pp. 77).
In order to provide more clarity to both the trivialization argument and Block’s
objection to it, we can consider the following diagram of an FSA:
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Figure 4: State transition diagram of a finite state automaton, based on (Block, 2002,
pp. 77)
This is a state transition diagram of a finite state automaton that performs 1-bit addition
without carry. Its behavior, like every finite state automaton, is fully determined by its
current state and input. In this case, the initial state is [A] and the final state is either [D]
or [E]. The set of inputs i is the set {i1, i2}. The set of outputs o is the set {o}. If, for
example, we have i = {1, 0}, then the FSA goes through the sequence of states <A C E>
and the output is o = {1}. By transiting through these states, our FSA has thereby
calculated 1 + 0. Now, what has been shown in the preceding argument is that every
open physical system implements a trace of every finite state automaton. For instance,
the sequence of states <A C E> is such a trace. Thus, if we know the inputs for a given
trace—in this case i = {1, 0}—the “combinatorial structure” of our FSA collapses and we
can represent this trace of the FSA with a simple inputless FSA consisting of a simple
linear path of states. Thus, if we know that i = {1, 0}, our FSA collapses to the following
form:
Figure 5: State transition diagram of same finite state automaton with input defined as i
= {1, 0}
It is a particular trace such as this that is implemented in every open physical
system, rather than the complete original FSA without inputs defined ahead of time.
And it is this fact that Block finds objectionable. It isn’t enough that every open physical
system can implement something like Figure 5; rather, for the trivialization argument to
go through, every open physical system must be able to implement something like
Figure 4. So says Block.
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But as Bishop points out, saying that counterfactuals matter commits one to
saying that non-entered machine states have causal powers, a tough pill to swallow. It’s
difficult to see, for instance, how the mere possibility that we could have transited from
state [C] to state [D] (though we did not in fact do so) could have any causal impact on
anything. To drive this point home, we can imagine (as Bishop invites us to do) that we
have a computing machine Q running a program (p) with known input (x) over some
finite time interval {t1…tk}. Further, let’s suppose that (p) is a Strong AI program such
that running it is sufficient for mental states. Now, let’s suppose we turn Q on and let it
run over the time interval in question. Then, over this time interval, Q(p, x) will
generate mental states. Once the time interval is up, we switch Q off. Now, over the
time interval in question, Q transits a finite number of states. These state transitions can
be fully replicated with an inputless finite state automaton. Thus, if Q(p, x) is sufficient
for mental states over the finite time interval in question, then so is this inputless finite
state automaton. The possibility that Q could have entered different states had the input
(x) been different clearly has no effect on whether Q has mental states given the input
(x) under consideration. Perhaps Q wouldn’t be very interesting if it could only accept a
single set of inputs, but that would not change the fact that Q would have mental states
over the finite time interval in question, assuming the truth of Strong AI and
computationalism. Block’s objection, therefore, carries little force.
Thus, just as we can map computational states to electrical states in the case of an
electronic digital computer, we can map computational states to the physical states of
any open physical system. What counts as computation is, therefore, entirely trivial.
Computationalism thus crumbles, establishing part (2) of my thesis.
Conclusion
What I hope to have shown is that the purely computational approach to the
mind is inadequate. What this paper has established is that (1) The thesis that the
appropriately programmed computer, by virtue of running the right program, would
literally have or be a mind in the same sense that you or I have (Strong AI) is false, and
(2) The thesis that mental states are identical to computational states/processes
(computationalism) is similarly false. This is all to say that pure computation can never
be sufficient for mind.
What are the implications of this result? Well, if I am right, then we are much
further away from sentient machines than many enthusiasts and futurists believe. For
instance, Amir Husain, the founder and CEO of SparkCognition as well as an author
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and popularizer of AI research, has recently written a book, The Sentient Machine, in
which he argues that sentient AI is seemingly right around the corner. Husain writes
regarding AGI (more on this term in a moment), “Whether in twenty, seventy, or two
hundred years, many in the community agree that AGI is on the horizon” (Husain,
2017, pg. 37).
Regarding the term AGI, Husain distinguishes between artificial narrow
intelligence (ANI) and artificial general intelligence (AGI). ANI includes things like
chess-playing programs and self-driving cars. ANI is capable of doing specialized tasks
that would normally be done by a human. AGI, on the other hand, would be capable of
a level of general intelligence and cognitive ability on par or better than that of humans.
As Husain writes, “In order to be considered AGI, an AI system would…need to
understand meaning and context, be able to synthesize new knowledge, have
intentionality, and—in all likelihood—be self-aware, so that it could understand what it
means to have agency in the world” (Husain, 2017, pg. 34). The realization of AGI,
therefore, would entail the truth of Strong AI. But, given the powerful arguments
against Strong AI, we have warrant for thinking that AGI cannot and will not be
realized, despite the sensational prognostications of many in the AI community.
With all this being said, what I have most certainly not shown in this paper is that
sentient machines of any kind are impossible. Perhaps it is possible to construct artificial
minds. I merely maintain that we won’t get there by way of simply programming a
computer, by way of pure computation.
Notes
1. This is opposed to Weak AI. Weak AI is simply the claim that we can simulate mental
processes with a computer and that computers can provide valuable insights into the
mind and how it might work (pg. 14, 226).
2. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines an effective method as follows: “A
method, or procedure, M, for achieving some desired result is called ‘effective’ (or
‘systematic’ or ‘mechanical’) just in case:
1. M is set out in terms of a finite number of exact instructions (each
instruction being expressed by means of a finite number of symbols);
2. M will, if carried out without error, produce the desired result in a finite
number of steps;
3. M can (in practice or in principle) be carried out by a human being
unaided by any machinery except paper and pencil;
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4. M demands no insight, intuition, or ingenuity, on the part of the human
being carrying out the method” (Copeland, 2017).
3. I’ll grant, however, that computation may be necessary for mind.
4. For clarification, it is obvious that the Chinese Room is analogous to a computer. In
fact, it really is a computer (that is, a Turing machine), albeit a quirky one. To cast the
elements of the Chinese Room in Turing’s own computer terminology, Clerk is the
executive unit and the control, and the sheets of paper and rulebook compose the store.
The sheets of paper are where calculations are carried out, and the rulebook is the table
of instructions or the program (Turing, 1950).
5. Edward Feser summarizes Dennett’s idea of homuncular decomposition as follows:
“We can usefully regard our minds as comprised of a number of subsystems that
perform various mental functions: visual processing, linguistic competence, and so on.
Each subsystem can itself be metaphorically understood as a ‘homunculus’—a ‘little
man’ who performs some particular task. But the functions performed by each of these
homunculi can, like our own minds, be thought of as comprised of yet more basic
functions performed by smaller subsystems; in other words, each of the homunculi
comprising our own minds can be thought of as comprising smaller homunculi of its
own” (Feser, 2005, pg. 151).
6. For instance, we can suppose that Clerk internalizes the Room (in the same way as
was done in response to the standard Systems Reply). He memorizes the rulebook and
runs through the program in his head. Furthermore, he implements the sensors by
using his own eyes (and possibly ears as well). And still, merely by virtue of running
the program, Clerk does not understand Chinese. There is certainly more that can be
said for the Robot Reply (for both sides), but for considerations of length for this paper,
I must direct the reader to Selmer Bringsjord and Ron Noel’s article “Real Robots and
the Missing Thought-Experiment in the Chinese Room Dialectic” for further discussion.
7. For example, suppose that x is a rubber tube and y is an esophagus. And suppose the
rubber tube is such that pouring water down it causes it to behave similarly or
identically to the esophagus with water pouring down it. In this case, the rubber tube
simulates the esophagus in this particular context because it replicates the property of
behaving in such-and-such a way when water is pouring down it. The rubber tube
might not, however, duplicate the esophagus because it might fail to replicate other
properties that the esophagus has such as having the property of making solid food
inside it behave in a certain way.
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8. Searle explains this more fully as follows: “Computation is defined purely formally or
abstractly in terms of the implementation of a computer algorithm, and not in terms of
energy transfer. Let me repeat this point: computation as standardly defined does not
name a machine process… Computation is the name of an abstract mathematical
process that can be implemented with machines that engage in energy transfer, but the
energy transfer is not part of the definition of computation. To state the point with a
little more precision: the notion ‘same-implemented program’ defines an equivalence
class that is specified not in terms of physical or chemical processes, but in terms of
abstract mathematical processes” (Searle, 2002, pp. 57).
9. Hauser could reply to this line of argument by insisting that whenever physical
processes are isomorphic to computational processes, the physical processes are
instantiating the computational processes. I shall have more to say about this shortly.
10. In other words, s1→ s2→ s3→ s4→ s5→ s6 is isomorphic to
[A]→[B]→[A]→[B]→[A]→[B].
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